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ABSTRACT
Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly
performance shares, has displaced stock options as the primary instrument for
compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S. This article
examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of
these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an
investor’s perspective. Notable observations include the following: Although
technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive
characteristics of options. But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and
other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at-the-money
options. Performance share plans can be designed to be effectively in, at, or out
of the money and these plans often employ relative performance measurement
that makes them analogous to rarely observed indexed stock options. But the
opacity of performance share plans creates risks for investors, and the two
accounting approaches applicable to these instruments both result in systematic
undervaluation for executive pay disclosure and financial reporting purposes.
Given the growing dominance of these instruments, this article advocates the
adoption of a mark-to-market accounting regime for all equity compensation.
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Introduction
“Stock options are on the verge of extinction.” Wall Street Journal, 8/26/13.1
Are executive stock options on the verge of extinction? A cursory look at the data would
suggest that many large public companies have abandoned conventional stock options in favor of
restricted stock. At the peak of the stock option boom in 2000, options accounted for over 60%
of the total value of compensation awarded to the top executives of a sample of 350 S&P 500
companies, while restricted stock grants contributed about 10%.2 In 2013, options accounted for
only 17% of senior executive pay at S&P 500 companies, while stock grants contributed 42%.3
Such a fundamental shift in the composition of equity pay in just a little over a decade
would seem to have profound implications for executives, shareholders, and their companies.
One commentator has suggested that the shift means more certain returns for executives and
simpler compensation, but also the loss of a powerful executive wealth generator and incentive
device.4 But it isn’t clear that any of this is true. First, options remain popular with start-up
firms, particularly tech companies.5 But even at S&P 500 firms, there is both more and less than
meets the eye in the switch from options to stock. Stock options have not been replaced with
traditional restricted stock – stock that “vests” or becomes owned outright with the simple
passage of time. Instead, the void has been filled by performance-vested stock, performance
shares, and similar “stock” instruments.6 A participant in a typical performance share plan
receives a variable number of shares after, say, three years, depending on firm performance
along any number of accounting or share-value metrics. Under these plans, stronger firm
performance generally means both more shares and more valuable shares, producing a multiplier
effect that resembles the economics of a stock option.7 So, while conventional options may be
on the way out, option-like leverage remains vibrant.
But this shift isn’t just an example of old wine in new bottles. There are significant
differences between traditional stock options and performance-based stock that have important
implications for participants, shareholders, and regulators. On the positive side, performance
share and performance-vested stock plans often employ relative performance metrics.8 The
number of shares awarded is a function of a company’s stock returns, earnings, or revenue
relative to the returns, earnings, or revenue at a peer group of companies. As a result, these
1

Emily Chasan, Last Gasp for Stock Options?, CFO Journal Blog, The Wall Street Journal.
David I. Walker, Evolving Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 611,
633 (2011) (reporting data based on grant date valuation).
3
Author’s calculation based on ExecuComp data.
4
Chasan, supra note x.
5
Pui-Wing Tam, Stock Options Still Popular with Tech Firms, The Valley, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 4, 2010, at
A13C.
6
Infra.
7
Infra.
8
Infra.
2
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instruments are much more responsive to firm-specific performance, answering the longstanding objection that traditional options were simply “pay for pulse” that rewarded executives
for general market rises.9 In fact, the economics of these instruments closely resembles that of
indexed stock options10 – a semi-mythical pay device that has been touted for years as the answer
to the pay for pulse problem but was rarely adopted, perhaps because of accounting and tax
constraints. Performance-based stock designs avoid those constraints.11
But from a shareholder advocacy perspective, there are downsides to performance-based
stock plans as well. Many of these plans are highly complex. Some involve multiple
performance metrics.12 It may be relatively simple to determine the number of shares that should
be awarded at the end of the performance period, but it is very difficult to gauge the value
transferred from company to executive at the time of grant. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), the accounting standard setter, thinks that we currently lack the technology to
determine the ex ante value of many of these instruments.13 Given that, how are conscientious
directors supposed to gauge the trade-offs between performance shares and options, and between
the various potential performance metrics? Moreover, unlike traditional stock options, which
tend to follow a one size fits all design, there is great variation in performance share plan metrics
and design. While increased customization may be efficiency enhancing, it makes it more
difficult for directors, shareholders, and even executives to compare plans from firm to firm. A
cynic might suspect that the shift to performance shares is just one more example of boards and
executives working together to obfuscate executive pay awards in order to lessen outrage over
the ever-increasing amounts transferred to senior management.
In addition, performance-based stock plans are both less and more “gameable” than
options. These plans universally gauge performance over a pre-determined period. Unlike
options, they do not allow participants to time exercise to their advantage.14 That’s an
improvement. But complex performance metrics are gameable in the choice of peer group, when
relative performance metrics are employed, and in the particular metrics selected, e.g., earnings,
sales, cash flow, or shareholder return. The chosen metric may perfectly align executive
incentives with firm objectives, or the choice might reflect executives’ private forecasts based on
inside information.15

9

E.g., Sudhakar V. Balachandran, Paying for a Pulse, Forbes.com, 10/15/2008. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO
Pay More Tightly to Performance; Options Grants May Depend On Meeting Financial Goals; Moving Beyond a
'Pulse', Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.
10
Unlike traditional employee stock options that have a fixed strike or exercise price, the strike price of an indexed
option is adjusted up or down based on increases or decreases in an index, such as the S&P 500 stock price index.
See infra.
11
Infra.
12
Infra.
13
Infra.
14
Infra.
15
Infra.
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Making matters worse, two different accounting regimes apply to performance-based
stock instruments depending on the specific metrics employed, both of which are favorable from
the firm/executive perspective in that they tend to reduce reported compensation expense and
increase earnings, although the mechanisms differ.16 One method, which applies to share price
or market-based performance hurdles, requires the use of complex models to estimate a grant
date fair value, providing firms with significant discretion to select assumptions that will
minimize reported compensation.
The other method, applicable to accounting-based
performance measures, results in a structural downward bias with respect to the expected
expense amount and also provides discretion to under-report executive pay as of the grant date.
Moreover, both methods are used when both types of performance measures are employed with
respect to a single pay award, multiplying the opportunity to under-report executive pay.
Although these plans are relatively new, firms are increasingly adopting multiple metrics.
We’ve seen this film before. Just as the highly favorable option accounting rules of the 1990s
contributed to that boom, favorable accounting for certain performance share plans already
appears to be skewing firm choices in this new era.17
Can these drawbacks be addressed while preserving the relative performance
measurement benefits of performance-based stock? Perhaps. Our experience with options may
provide a useful model. It took many years to develop financial reporting rules that leveled the
playing field between various equity instruments and disclosure requirements that would allow
investors to evaluate and confirm the company-reported valuation of option grants.
Unfortunately, the level playing field for equity pay accounting lasted less than a decade.18 At a
minimum, the rules need to be revised to eliminate the discrepancies between various new equity
pay instruments. More fundamentally, it may be time to stop relying on ex ante valuation of
equity pay for accounting purposes and adopt a mark-to-market approach in determining the
annual expense to be associated with all of these instruments. This step would not prevent
opportunistic mis-valuation of these instruments, but it would reduce the incentive to engage in
that behavior.
In addition, much more disclosure of the assumptions used in valuing new equity grants
is required. Going further, we might also require disclosure of all of the details and results of the
simulations used to value these instruments. Peer group choice must be fully justified and
broader groups (e.g., the S&P 500) might be preferred or mandated to reduce gaming. Firms
should be required to justify performance metrics and, in particular, changes in performance
metrics, which might be opportunistic.19
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part I provides a primer on the law
and economics of equity compensation, focusing on the incentive-generating properties of
16

Infra.
Infra.
18
Infra.
19
Infra.
17
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conventional stock and option grants, relative performance evaluation, and tax and accounting
constraints. Part II describes and offers potential explanations for the dramatic shift in executive
pay practices over the last decade. Part III analyzes performance-based equity pay, focusing on
the now-dominant performance-based stock category, dissecting examples of the most
commonly encountered variants, and relating these to conventional equity pay instruments.
Although performance-based stock plans now account for the largest single slice of aggregate
senior executive pay at S&P 500 firms, performance-based option grants and long-term cashbased performance plans are observed as well, and are briefly considered. Part IV provides an
assessment, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of performance-based stock as an
executive pay instrument. Particular attention is paid in this Part to disparities in accounting and
disclosure rules that already appear to be influencing compensation design and to a proposed
solution – mark-to-market accounting for all equity compensation.

I. A Primer on the Law and Economics of Executive Equity Compensation
This Part sets the stage for our consideration of performance-based stock compensation
by reviewing the terms and economics of conventional stock and option pay, as well as the tax
and accounting rules that play such an important role in executive pay design.
Equity-based compensation has dominated the pay packages of senior corporate
executives since the mid-1990s.20 A principal reason firms use equity pay is to create incentives
that will mitigate managerial agency costs. Agency costs arise from the separation of ownership
and control that characterizes large, public corporations.21 These costs reflect the divergence
between managerial actions and decisions that would maximize shareholder value and actual
actions and decisions, plus monitoring and other costs undertaken to minimize that divergence.22
These agency costs are not totally avoidable, but they can be reduced by designing compensation
to better align executives’ economic interests with shareholder interests. Long-term, equitybased compensation plays a clear role in that effort.23
Conventional stock options, and to a lesser extent restricted stock, reigned supreme
during the early years of the equity pay era. These stock and option instruments were highly
uniform. Options almost always provided the holder with the right to purchase shares at a future
date by paying an amount equal to the market price of the stock on the date of grant, an
instrument known as an at-the-money option.24 Restricted stock was even simpler. Classically,
20

Walker, supra (Vandy).
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
22
Id.
23
Walker, supra (Vandy).
24
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds, Handbook of Labor
Economics 2458 (1999). Typically, these options would first become exercisable, or “vest”, within three or four
years of grant and would be exercisable at the discretion of the holder for up to ten years following grant. These
options were not transferable.
21
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a firm would award a tranche of shares to an executive on a given date. The shares would be
subject to forfeiture if employment terminated before the shares vested and became owned
outright. That vesting might occur on one date in the future or a fraction might vest annually for
a number of years. Over time, the award of restricted stock units has largely supplanted actual
grants of restricted stock.25 Instead of issuing stock at grant, firms issuing restricted stock units
promise to deliver stock when the shares vest. Although there may be differences in the
treatment of dividends and voting rights,26 restricted stock and restricted stock units are
essentially identical economically, and the term “restricted stock” will be used to refer to both.27
Both stock and options tie pay to stock price performance. Stock does so in a linear
fashion. Assuming that the shares ultimately vest, a dollar increase in share price translates into
an additional dollar of wealth for the holder of a restricted share.28
The intrinsic value of an option – the value that would be realized if the option were
exercised immediately – follows the “hockey stick” pattern displayed in the figure below. As
long as the stock price is less than the exercise price, the option has zero intrinsic value. To the
extent that the stock price exceeds the strike price, the option has positive intrinsic value equal to
the difference. But prior to expiration, an option’s total value exceeds its intrinsic value because
the stock price may rise, increasing the payout on the option. The full value of an unexercised
option also increases and decreases with increases and decreases in the share price, but the
relationship is not linear, it is convex.29 An option that is far out of the money, i.e., with strike
price far in excess of the current value of the underlying shares, has a low value and a value that
is relatively insensitive to the value of the underlying shares. The value of an option that is far in
the money, i.e., with strike price far below the current value of the underlying shares, approaches
the current share price less the exercise price, and that value moves dollar for dollar with small
changes in the underlying share price. The relationship is plotted in the figure below.30

25

Hay Group, the Executive Edition, Sept. 2013.
Hay Group, the Executive Edition, Sept. 2013.
27
Another difference is that IRC section 83(b) elections can be made for restricted stock grants but not for grants of
restricted stock units (RSUs). An 83(b) election results in taxation of the recipient based on the grant date value of
the award rather than the realized value on vesting. But there are significant downsides to 83(b) elections and they
are rarely observed in the public company context, so this difference is of little real consequence. Myron S. Scholes
et al., Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach 221 (5th ed. 2014). See Robert L. McDonald, Is It
Optimal to Accelerate the Payment of Incomes Tax on Share-Based Compensation? Section 2.3 (Working Paper,
Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mcdonald/htm/opexer.pdf.
28
Walker, supra (Vandy).
29
Walker, supra (Vandy). When graphed, a convex relationship presents a U-shaped curve. The relationship
between option value and the price of the underlying shares tracks the right half of the U.
30
In the figure, the asset “spot” price refers to the current market price of the stock.
26
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Economists use the term “delta” to describe the change in the value of an instrument
arising from a small change in the underlying share price. Restricted stock has a delta equal to
1.0. Options have a delta of less than 1.0.31 Per share, options provide less of an incentive to
increase the share price than does stock. However, options are also cheaper to grant than stock.
Remember that conventional restricted stock vests with the simple passage of time. As long as
an executive remains employed, she is certain to receive something of value – more or less value
depending on the share price – but something of value nonetheless. Not so with an option. The
option may expire unexercised out of the money. Thus, the expected cost of providing an option
is much less than that of issuing stock. When these two effects are combined, it turns out that
per dollar of compensation expense, options produce stronger incentives than restricted stock –
more delta per dollar.32
In addition to increasing the sensitivity of pay to share price performance, replacing stock
compensation with equally valuable option compensation increases the sensitivity of pay to the
volatility of share prices. Economists use the term “vega” to denote the sensitivity of option
value to volatility.33 The value of shares is not directly affected by changes in volatility, and thus
restricted stock has vega of zero. The value of an option, on the other hand, increases with
increasing volatility of the underlying share price. Options have positive vega. Thus, adding
options to a compensation package tends to increase an executive’s appetite for volatility, which
means increasing the appetite for taking on risky projects. If one believes that executives tend to
31

An option that is far in the money and is almost certain to be exercised has a delta that approaches 1.0. Options
that are at the money or somewhat in or out of the money have a delta of less than 1.0. See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS,
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 251 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining the concept of the option delta).
32
Walker, supra (Vandy).
33
Hull, supra.
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be excessively risk averse because they have so much of their financial and human capital tied up
in their firms, option pay can mitigate this agency problem.34 This is the classic corporate
finance story for the adoption of option-based pay.
Although options are uniformly granted at the money, this is not inevitable; nor is it
clearly optimal. Pay packages provide compensation and incentives. Directors want to provide
high-powered incentives to encourage executives to work hard and to take on risky projects, but
pay packages must be mutually acceptable, and executives – who cannot easily diversify – apply
large discounts to very risky pay. It is costly, in other words, for shareholders to impose high
delta and high vega pay packages on executives.35
Restricted stock, which in economic terms is an option with an exercise price of zero, is
the safest form of conventional equity pay from the point of view of the executive. At-themoney options are generally risky. In-the-money options with a positive exercise price fall in
between stock and at-the-money options on this spectrum. Out-of-the-money options are even
riskier. 36 Ideally firms would select the “moneyness” of their equity pay packages to optimize
compensation and incentives, to balance executive risk aversion against the value of creating
high-powered incentives.
Corporate finance researchers have studied the design of equity pay extensively and have
concluded that the optimal arrangement ranges from far in-the-money options (i.e., restricted
stock) to far out of the money options, depending on firm and executive characteristics.37
However, many studies have concluded that within a certain range of assumptions, in-the-money
options would be optimal.38 So why are conventional options uniformly granted at the money?
Tax and accounting rules play a leading role, as will be discussed below.

34

See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 29 (2003)
(explaining the risk aversion of under-diversified executives). Shareholders, by comparison, are assumed to be
diversified and risk neutral.
35
See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5
(2002) (explaining that “[r]estricting the trading and hedging activities of option recipients” causes executives
receiving the options to “value the options below their cost to shareholders”); see also John E. Core et al., Executive
Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 30 (noting that equity
compensation is risky because stock prices are a noisy measure of firm performance and that recipients must be
compensated for taking on the non-diversifiable risk).
36
One way to think about this is to consider the odds of an option expiring out of the money. Restricted stock
cannot expire out of the money. An option that is in the money at grant is less likely to expire out of the money than
an option that is at the money at grant. Etc.
37 Compare Hall & Murphy, supra note x, at 26–27 (concluding that “when existing compensation is adjusted,
incentives are maximized through restricted stock grants rather than options”) with Richard A. Lambert & David F.
Larcker, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and Incentives 2 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=527822 (“exercise price in the optimal contract is frequently far
‘out of the money’ “).
38
See Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING & FIN.
1255, 1227 (2004) (“incentive-maximizing exercise price is typically greater than zero but less than the stock
price”); Oded Palmon et al., Optimal Strike Prices of Stock Options for Effort-Averse Executives, 32 J. BANKING &
FIN. 229, 230-31 (2008) (simulations suggest that options are optimally granted in the money); Yisong S. Tian,
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Conventional options are uniformly granted with a fixed exercise price. This is another
initially puzzling uniformity since corporate finance theorists predict that firms would employ
relative performance evaluation (RPE) to improve the efficiency of incentive contracts,39 and
fixing the exercise price of an option foregoes an opportunity to introduce RPE into the scheme.
Stock prices (and option values) rise and fall depending on the performance of a specific firm but
also on the performance of the firm’s sector or the overall market. Executives have no control
over the overall market; little control over the performance of their peers; and the most control
over the performance of their firm. The idea behind RPE is to tie compensation as closely as
possible to performance outcomes within the control of the executive and eliminate risks over
which executives have no control. In the case of stock options, RPE would be explicitly
implemented by adjusting the exercise prices of options for increases or decreases in the average
share price of a peer group of companies or of the overall market. This is known as an indexed
option.40 Since shareholders must compensate executives for taking on un-controllable risks,
adopting more efficient, indexed option contracts should ultimately redound to the benefit of
shareholders.41
More prosaically, there are two obvious advantages to indexing stock options. First,
indexation eliminates the possibility of executive windfalls that arise when compensation
consists of traditional options and the overall market rises, lifting all boats. It is very hard to
look at the stock market run up in the 1990s and not conclude that many executives holding
options reaped unearned gains. Second, indexation also mitigates the risk that a market
downturn will unfairly penalize high-performing executives holding conventional options and
that conventional options will move far out of the money in this scenario and cease providing
effective incentives.
Absent regulatory constraints, firms might attempt to design equity pay packages to
minimize agency costs as suggested above. I say might, because another school of thought
posits that maximizing shareholder value is not the sole objective of this process.42 But even
those who adhere strongly to the “optimal contracting” view of the executive pay setting process

Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options (Working Paper, Apr. 30,
2001) at 32 (arguing that the optimal option design ranges from at the money to deep in the money, i.e., restricted
stock, depending on degree of risk aversion).
39
Bengt R. Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982).
40
See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 101
(Mar. – Apr. 1999).
41
But see Ingolf Dittmann et al, Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts, 26 REV. FIN. STUDIES (2013) (arguing
that indexation reduces option delta requiring firms to issue more indexed options to maintain incentives and that the
tradeoff is generally suboptimal); Pierre Chaigneau et al, The Value of Informativeness for Contracting (working
paper 2015) (showing that indexation reduces incentives).
42
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (hereinafter BFW) (proposing a managerial power theory
of the executive pay setting process).
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recognize that tax and accounting rules strongly influence and sometimes limit what can be
achieved.43
It seems unlikely that the failure to index options was a result of obscurity. The idea was
repeatedly floated in the 1990s. Alfred Rappaport promoted the concept in a Harvard Business
Review article in 1999.44 And a few firms, such as Level 3 Communications, experimented with
indexed options and received significant attention in the press.45 But the idea never caught on.
So, we have two puzzles. Why are all options granted at the money and why didn’t firms
index exercise prices? Accounting and tax rules, I believe, figure prominently in the answer.
Through 2005, U.S. accounting rules strongly favored the issuance of conventional, fixed
exercise price, non-discounted (i.e., at- or out-of-the-money) options over other forms of equity
pay, such as restricted stock. A grant of restricted stock resulted in firms booking an expense
over time for compensation cost equal to the market value of the stock at the time of grant, but
no expense was recorded for fixed exercise price, non-discounted options at the time of grant,
vesting, or exercise.46 These options were “free” from an accounting perspective. (Indexed
options, by contrast, were subject to a relatively onerous “mark-to-market” accounting regime
under the pre-2006 accounting rules.47) Kevin Murphy has argued that the popularity of
conventional at-the-money options in the late 1990s and early 2000s reflected the mis-perceived
cost of these options arising from their highly favorable accounting treatment.48
In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a new standard
requiring firms to determine the grant date fair value of all equity compensation and to recognize
this cost as an expense over the vesting period of the stock or option.49 This shift leveled the
accounting playing field for stock and conventional options, and in all likelihood contributed to

43

E.g., Murphy, supra (1999) (suggesting stock option boom resulted from misperceived low cost of option pay
resulting from former accounting regime).
44
Rappaport, supra note x, at 101; see also Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A
Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 31-50 (1997).
45
E.g., Joann S. Lublin, Pay for Outperforming: James Crowe, Chief of Level 3 Communications, Makes the Case
for Linking Stock Options to Market-Beating Gains, Wall St. J. R8 (Apr. 6, 2000) (reporting on Level 3
Communication’s use of S&P 500 indexed options).
46
See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972) [hereinafter
APB 25]. Under APB 25, only the intrinsic value of an option – the degree to which an option was in the money –
at the date of grant was recognized as an expense.
47
See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION ¶ 66-67 (June 30,
1993). The pre-2006 rules also required performance shares, discussed in the next Part, to be marked to market.
48
His argument is that managers and directors mis-perceived the cost of this form of compensation as a result of the
artificially favorable accounting treatment. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How
We Got There 80 (2012), available at (http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2041679) (“The accounting treatment of
options promulgated the mistaken belief that options could be granted without any cost to the company. . . .
Nonetheless, the idea that options were free (or at least cheap) was erroneously accepted in too many boardrooms”).
49
See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123 (REVISED 2004)
[henceforth SFAS 123R].
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the movement away from conventional options in the 2000s. Now that they were no longer
“free,” firms were less inclined to issue options.50
Federal income tax rules have played at least a supporting role in this story. Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) § 162(m), enacted in 1993, limits the deductibility of non-performance
based compensation issued to certain senior executives to $1 million per year. Although firms
increasingly treat this $1 million "cap" as simply a consideration, and not a limitation on nonperformance based pay, the enactment of 162(m) likely contributed to the shift in favor of
options in the early 1990s. While conventional options easily qualify as performance-based pay,
salary (and time-vested restricted stock) does not.51
Today, a tax rule enacted in 2004 – IRC § 409A – essentially precludes the issuance of
in-the-money or indexed exercise price options. Under regular U.S. tax rules, compensation
arising from a conventional, non-discounted option is not taxed until the option is exercised.52
However, under § 409A, compensation arising from a discounted or indexed option would be
taxed at vesting, rather than at exercise, and would be subjected to an additional 20% penalty
tax.53
Fixed exercise price, out-of-money options are feasible, but are rarely seen, presumably
because recipients excessively discount these options. Recipients would tend to focus
excessively on their out-of-the-money-ness.54 Given § 409A and this behavioral effect, it is no
surprise that 99+% of options are issued with a fixed exercise price that is at the money.
Of course, it is also possible that the failure to index options is consistent with optimal
contracting. Despite the contracting advantages of RPE identified by Holmstrom, option
indexation has been shown to reduce incentives, and it is possible that the tradeoff simply isn’t

50

Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There 97 (2012), available at
(http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2041679).
51
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (providing that stock options will be deemed to be performance based if granted
by the firm’s compensation committee in accordance with a plan meeting certain minimal requirements). David
Schizer concludes that while indexed options can qualify as performance based pay under IRC §162(m), the path to
qualification is more cumbersome. See David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on
Managerial Agency Costs 10 (working paper, Sept. 19, 2014).
52
I assume in this discussion that options are non-qualified options, i.e., not incentive stock options (ISOs) as
defined in IRC 422. The tax rules applicable to ISOs differ, but ISOs account for an economically trivial portion of
executive equity pay.
53
These option designs fall outside of a safe harbor within §409A. As a result, they are treated like other deferred
compensation, and under § 409A participant control over the timing of realization of deferred compensation results
in penalties. See infra note x and accompanying text. In addition, indexed options and options granted in the money
do not qualify for the safe harbor presumption of performance based pay applicable to at the money options. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (stock options deemed to satisfy the safe harbor presumption if, inter alia, “the
amount of compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the stock after the
date of the grant”).
54
See Brian J. Hall, The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6674, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=108563
(finding a “bias toward valuing options according [to] what they would be worth if exercised today”).
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worth it.55 However, as we will see shortly, firms have embraced RPE in performance share
plans that are economically similar to options, but do not suffer the same adverse tax
consequences, suggesting that tax and accounting rules are the better explanations.

II. The Rise of Performance-Based Executive Compensation
According to the Hay Group, 27.4% of the ex ante value of compensation paid to the
CEO’s of 300 of the largest U.S. companies in 2012 consisted of performance-based equity pay,
that is, performance-based stock or options.56 A very large fraction of this pay would have
consisted of performance-based stock. The same Hay Group study found that 78% of these 300
firms issued performance-based stock to their top executives in 2012, while only 5% issued
performance-based options to this group. (16.0% of the firms made awards to top executives
under cash-based long-term performance plans.)57 Similarly, analyzing the compensation of top
executives of over 1000 large public companies, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (BBCK)
found that 97% of the firms that utilized performance-based equity pay issued performancebased stock, while only 8% issued performance-based options.58
Performance-based equity pay existed a decade ago, but was much less frequently
observed. BBCK’s data indicate that the fraction of equity pay consisting of performance-based
pay has increased by 350% from 2001.59
Meanwhile, use of the once ubiquitous conventional at-the-money stock option continues
to decline. These options accounted for only 16.4% of CEO pay for the Hay Group sample of
firms in 2012.60 At the peak of the option boom around 2000, conventional options accounted
for over 60% of senior executive pay.61 Rounding out the picture, use of conventional timevested restricted stock has increased modestly over the decade, and, with a 13.2% market share
of CEO compensation for the Hay Group sample in 2012, conventional restricted stock may be
overtaking conventional options for second position among equity pay categories.62
Of course, the top 300 and even the top 1000 firms are only a subset of U.S. public
companies. Nonetheless, pay practices at these firms deserve close attention because they tend
55

See Dittmann et al, supra note x; Chaigneau et al, supra note x.
Hay Group, Executive Compensation 2013: Data, Trends and Strategies 19 (2014).
57
Hay Group (2014) at 20, 21.
58
J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive
Compensation, Table 1 (working paper, Dec. 18, 2013) (hereinafter BBCK (2013)). BBCK’s sample was based on
the largest 750 companies each year between 1998 and 2012 for a total of 1833 firms. Roughly 1100 to 1400 firms
are represented each year.
59
BBCK (2013) at Table 1. This figure actually understates the transformation. Performance-accelerated stock and
option grants made up a sizable portion of performance-based equity pay in 2001, and a negligible fraction in 2012.
As discussed below, performance-accelerated equity is a closer kin to conventional stock and option pay than it is to
today’s performance shares and performance-vested options.
60
Hay Group (2014) at 19.
61
Walker, supra (Vandy) at 633.
62
Hay Group (2014) at 19, 22 (making this prediction).
56
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to be leaders in the adoption of executive pay practices and because they make up such a large
fraction of U.S. market capitalization.63 For the average investor, these are the firms that matter
most from a governance perspective.
Explaining the shift from options to performance shares really involves two questions:
why the shift away from options, and why the shift to performance shares? In hindsight, the
heavy reliance on options in the late 1990s/early 2000s looks like a bubble induced by the
artificially favorable accounting treatment of option compensation that was discussed above.64
Recall that prior to a change in accounting standards adopted in 2004, firms incurred no charge
to earnings at any point for conventional at-the-money options issued to executives and
employees as compensation. All other forms of compensation, including restricted stock,
resulted in an accounting expense. In 2004, the FASB mandated “fair value” accounting for all
forms of equity compensation, leveling the accounting playing field for stock and options.65
According to this view, once the thumb on the scale in favor of options was removed, options
looked relatively less attractive and their use declined.66
Other factors may have contributed to the shift away from options.67 The bursting of the
dot-com bubble around 2000 and the end of “irrational exuberance”68 likely led to an increase in
the perceived riskiness of options on the part of executives, reducing their attractiveness.69
Options-related scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other firms in the early 2000s, as well
as a stock option backdating scandal in the mid-2000s, all made “options” something of a four
letter word in the minds of the media, investors, and the general public.70 A tax cut on dividends
in 2003 increased the attractiveness of dividends.71 Because their options are rarely “dividend
protected”, executives holding options are thought to be averse to paying dividends. Investors
anticipating this antipathy might have pushed for fewer options in executive pay packages.72

63

The S&P 500 represents 80% of US stock market capitalization. S&P Dow Jones Indices, Market Capitalization
Coverage of S&P U.S. Equities, http://us.spindices.com/documents/additional-material/sp-500-trifold.pdf (last
visited Aug. 19, 2015).
64
Walker, supra (Vandy); Murphy supra.
65
SFAS 123R, supra.
66
Murphy, supra.
67
Walker (Vandy) (discussing potential explanations for the shift away from conventional options).
68
Alan Greenspan, 1996.
69
Walker, supra (Vandy).
70
Walker, supra (Vandy).
71 The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut the top marginal federal income tax rate
applicable to dividends from thirty-five percent to fifteen percent. For evidence on the impact on dividend payouts,
see Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend
Tax Cut, 62 J. Fin. 1935, 1935 (2007) (reporting that thirty-five percent of S&P 1500 firms increased dividend
payouts in 2003 compared with twenty-seven percent increasing payouts in the two prior years and that the rate of
firms newly adopting dividend programs increased from about one in a hundred in 2001 and 2002 to one in ten in
2003).
72
Walker, supra (Vandy).
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The foregoing factors, and others, 73 might help explain a shift away from options and in
favor of stock, but why the heavy shift into performance-based stock? Why not conventional
time-vested restricted stock? We can’t be certain, but conventional time-vested restricted stock
has several drawbacks as an equity pay instrument. First, conventional time-vested restricted
stock does not qualify as performance-based pay under § 162(m) of the tax code.74 In a world in
which the median S&P 500 CEO receives annual compensation of over $10 million, the $1
million senior executive pay deduction limitation under § 162(m) and the performance-based pay
exception are important.75 By contrast, performance-based stock plans can easily qualify as fully
deductible performance-based pay.76
Second, the increasingly influential proxy advisory firms – Institutional Shareholder
Services and Glass Lewis – do not consider time-vested restricted stock to be performance-based
pay. These firms tend to give negative recommendations on “say on pay” proposals when
companies include significant levels of time-vested restricted stock in their proposed pay
packages.77
Third, and relatedly, boards may not believe that simple time-vested restricted stock
provides the optimal incentives for executives. We have seen that both stock and options tie pay
to stock price performance, but that options, per dollar of compensation expense, provide more
highly powered incentives than stock – incentives to increase the share price and incentives to
take on risky projects.78 Of course, option pay can potentially lead to an excessive appetite for
risk. Some commentators have blamed heavy executive option portfolios for the excesses that
led to the 2008 financial crisis.79 Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible that some directors would
conclude that a wholesale shift from option pay to time-vested restricted stock would excessively
discourage risk taking. We will see that performance-based stock has incentive properties that
73

Walker, supra (Vandy).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) and note x, supra.
75
Equilar, CEO Pay Strategies Report 8 (2014) (reporting median S&P 500 CEO total compensation for 2013 of
$10.132 million). The importance of qualifying executive pay as performance based would disappear if legislation
proposed by Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.), and Senators Jack Reed (D-R.I.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) is
enacted. Both the House and Senate bills propose to disallow all deductions for exec pay in excess of $1 mm,
regardless of composition. See Equilar, CEO Pay Strategies Report 18 (2014). Donald Kalfen, House Bill Would
Extend Reach of 162(m) to All Employees and Eliminate (Significant) Exemption for Performance-Based
Compensation, Meridian Client Update, Meridian Compensation Partners, LLC. 1 (Feb. 22, 2014),
http://www.meridiancp.com/wp-content/uploads/house-bill-will-eliminate-tax-exemption.pdf.
76
Supra.
77
See Institutional Shareholder Services, United States Taft-Hartley Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2015 Policy
Recommendations 30 (Feb. 4, 2015), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015-taft-hartleyadvisory-services-us-guidelines.pdf; James F. Reda & David M. Schmidt, SAY-on-PAY: Changing How Executives
Get Paid, 29(7) Financial Executive 24, 27 (Sep. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2376329.
78
Walker, supra (Vandy).
79
Lucian Bebchuk, Executive Pay and the Financial Crisis, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & FINANCIAL REGULATION, http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/01/executive-pay-and-thefinancial-crisis/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive
Compensation
at
Bear
Stearns
and
Lehman
2000-2008,
at
1-2
(Nov.
24,
2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1513522.
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are much closer to options than simple time-vested restricted stock. Firms may have adopted
performance-based stock plans to retain the incentive properties of options while abandoning a
disfavored instrument.
Finally, and more pessimistically, time-vested restricted stock is a fairly transparent
device. Boards and executives who are interesting in obfuscating pay levels might prefer a more
opaque instrument, particularly one that can be undervalued through judicious selection of
assumptions.80 As we will see below, performance-based stock plans are highly complex and
opaque. One cannot generate an ex ante value by plugging a few variables into an online
calculator, as one can with options. This point will be explored in greater detail in Part X below.

III. Understanding Performance-Based Executive Compensation
Performance-based pay is certainly not one size fits all. Both stock and options are being
granted to executives contingent on satisfaction of performance conditions. We will look at both
types of instruments (as well as cash-based performance plans), but the focus will be on the more
common performance-based stock grants. But even with respect to stock grants, there are
variations along several dimensions – absolute and relative performance metrics, accounting and
market-based hurdles, variable share versus fixed share awards. Thus, it is not possible to
provide a complete description that captures the entire range. Nonetheless, this Part describes
the major strands that make up the stock award sector of performance-based equity pay.

A. Performance-Based Stock Plans
Like conventional restricted stock and restricted stock units, performance-based restricted
stock can entail the issuance of shares or the equivalent promise to deliver shares at vesting. The
innovation here is that the shares vest only if both time and performance criteria are satisfied.
Many different metrics are employed in designing performance-based stock plans, and
many plans include more than one metric. According to executive pay consultant F.W. Cook,
the most popular metrics for 2013 equity grants at the largest U.S. public companies were (in
descending order): total shareholder return, profit (EPS, etc.), capital efficiency (ROE, etc.),
revenue, cash flow, and “other”, which might include safety or quality measures.81 45% of the
companies in F.W. Cook’s sample used a single performance measure in their plans, with the rest
using two or more measures.82

80

BFW, supra at 789 (discussing the critical role of camouflage in minimizing investor outrage and increasing
executive pay under the managerial power view of the compensation-setting process).
81
Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., The 2014 Top 250 Report 12 (2014) (hereinafter Cook (2014)). Cook’s sample
includes the 250 largest companies in the S&P 500 index.
82
Cook (2014) at 13. A recent study by Equilar provides similar data. For 2013, they found that 40% of S&P 500
firms that granted long-term performance awards to their CEOs used a single metric; 36% used two metrics; and the
remaining 24% used three or more metrics. Equilar (2014) at 2-3.
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Another major design consideration is whether to base the plan on an absolute measure of
performance, a measurement relative to a peer group, or both. In F.W. Cook’s sample, a large
majority of firms employing a total shareholder return metric used a relative measure, while the
large majority of firms using accounting-based metrics employed absolute measures.83 In
BBCK’s sample of top executive pay at large U.S. companies, 82% of firms issuing performance
equity in 2012 employed at least one absolute metric and 48% employed at least one relative
metric. Obviously, many of these companies utilized both.84
Finally, the number of shares potentially subject to vesting may be fixed or variable.
Following the typical convention, I will use the term “performance-vested restricted stock” to
refer to grants of a fixed number of shares or of units entailing the promise to deliver a fixed
number of shares upon satisfaction of vesting conditions. I will use the term “performance
shares” to refer to performance-based stock plans involving a variable number of shares.
Before turning to performance-vested restricted stock, I should say a word about
performance-accelerated restricted stock. Performance-accelerated restricted stock vests after a
certain number of years, if the participant remains employed, but the shares can vest earlier if
performance goals are achieved. Fifty-two of 1369 firms (4%) in BBCK’s sample issued
performance-accelerated restricted stock in 2004, but these instruments have virtually
disappeared with only nine firms (less than 1%) issuing them in 2012.85 Given the paucity of
these plans, and the fact that their incentive properties are not that different from conventional
time-vested restricted stock, we will devote no more attention to them.
1. Performance-Vested Restricted Stock
Performance-vested restricted stock refers to grants of a single tranche of shares (or the
equivalent promise to deliver the tranche) that vest only if both time and performance hurdles are
achieved. For example, in 2013 Medtronic provided its president, Omar Ishrak, with 72,585
restricted stock units which vest on the third anniversary of the date of grant provided that Ishrak
remains employed by Medtronic and that the company achieves a cumulative compound annual
growth rate in earnings per share of 3%.86 Assuming that Ishrak remains in office, there are two
possibilities. If the company achieves the performance goal, Ishrak receives the shares, and the
result is equivalent to simple time-vested restricted stock. The value of the grant, ex post, is a
linear function of the company’s share price at vesting. If the performance goal is not met,
Ishrak receives nothing. The performance relationship here is not very nuanced, and
unsurprisingly, the proxy materials note that the performance goal for vesting is “intentionally

83

Cook (2014) at 12.
BBCK (2013) at Table 2, Panel E. BBCK’s data represent firm years. Some of this overlap could reflect
performance equity plans utilizing both absolute and relative measures while some could reflect multiple plans at a
given firm, one or more utilizing absolute and one or more utilizing relative metrics. It is impossible to say from the
data presented by BBCK.
85
BBCK (2013) at Table 2, Panel A.
86
Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39, 51, 52 (July 12, 2013).
84
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less than Medtronic’s target performance” for growth in EPS.87
designed to be an easy hurdle.

In other words, this was

While some firms employ easily achievable targets, other firms lessen the potential
harshness of an all-or-nothing restricted stock performance hurdle of this sort by extending the
period during which the performance goal may be achieved. For example, in 2013 Danaher
Corp. granted RSUs to its executives that vest no earlier than the 4th and 5th anniversary of grant
(50% on each anniversary) but that can vest as late as the 10th anniversary of grant.88 In order for
these RSUs to vest, the company must achieve four consecutive quarters with adjusted EPS in
excess of 110% of 2013 EPS and positive net income.89 As before, the value of the grant is a
linear function of the share price at vesting, but in this case, vesting may be deferred, if necessary
to achieve the performance goal.
While the relationship between share price and actual payoff if the shares vest is linear,
the relationship between share price and the expected payoff associated with the performancevested restricted stock issued to Medtronic’s Ishrak is non-linear, as illustrated in the figure
below. Although the company admits that the performance target is not aggressive,90 there is
some possibility that it will not be achieved. In all likelihood, Medtronic’s share price would
suffer as a result. There is, in other words, a positive correlation between the likelihood that the
earnings growth target will be met (and that the shares will vest) and Medtronic’s share price.
For illustration, I am assuming that the likelihood of vesting is zero if Medtronic’s share price is
zero in three years’ time (a safe bet) and that the likelihood increases until it reaches 100% if
Medtronic maintains the $39 share price that existed at the time of the 2013 grant to Ishrak. But
the details are not important. The point is that in states of the world in which Medtronic is
successful and its share price rises, the grant is equivalent to time-vested restricted stock, but in
states of the world in which Medtronic suffers in performance and share price, there is a risk that
the grant will not vest and will be worthless. But to reiterate, since the relationship between
Medtronic’s earnings growth and share price is not fixed – there is only some correlation – one
cannot plot actual payoff value against future share price, only an illustrative expected payout.
This payoff profile has something of the “hockey stick” look of the option payoff profile,
suggesting some delta and vega in excess of those associated with conventional time-vested
restricted stock. But the “optionality” here is not pronounced. The performance hurdle is not
aggressive; the shares are likely to vest. The incentives created by this instrument are not that
different from conventional restricted stock.

87

Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39.
Danaher Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 47 (April 2, 2014).
89
Danaher Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 47.
90
Medtronic, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 39.
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2. Performance Shares
We now turn to performance-based stock plans involving a variable share award, aka,
performance shares. As noted, performance share plans may utilize any number of metrics and
performance may be measured on an absolute or relative basis, or a plan may include both
absolute and relative measures. To simplify exposition, I will focus on simple plans involving
either absolute or relative metrics.91
a. Absolute Metrics
While details vary, performance share plans typically define a range of company
performance that results in a smoothly increasing number of shares vesting at the end of the
performance period, which is most commonly three years.92 Most plans include a performance
threshold. If the threshold is not achieved, no shares are issued. Plans also include a cap on the
number of shares issued that corresponds to a maximum performance level. Companies that
employ profits, capital efficiency, revenue, and cash flow performance metrics generally look to
company performance only, with no adjustment for peer or market performance.93 We’ll call
these absolute performance metrics. Plans employing relative performance metrics will be
considered in the next subsection.
91

Well, not exactly. It turns out that Coke has recently added a relative metric to its plan and CenturyLink has
adopted an absolute performance cap on payouts from its relative plan. These plans are complicated, but these two
cases still provide helpful examples of the use of absolute and relative metrics.
92
Cook (2014) at 14.
93
Cook (2014) at 12.
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For example, Coca-Cola has issued performance share units to its senior executives for
several years.94 For several years, the sole performance measure was compounded annual
growth in economic profit.95 Each year, the compensation committee determined a threshold,
target, and maximum profit growth performance level based on company-specific and macroeconomic factors. For their 2013 to 2015 plan, the threshold, target, and maximum profit growth
levels were 4.4%, 6.4%, and 8.4%.96 In 2013, Coke’s CEO, Muhtar Kent, received performance
share units of roughly 100,000 shares for threshold performance, 200,000 for target performance,
and 300,000 for maximum performance.97 If the company fails to meet the threshold growth
figure, he will receive no shares; if the company exceeds the maximum level, he will receive the
maximum 300,000 shares.98 Between the threshold, target, and maximum performance levels,
the number of shares issued is linearly interpolated. The relationship between profit growth and
shares issued is described in figure X.
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As the following chart demonstrates, the value of Kent’s award at payout is a function
both of the growth in profits and the share price at payout. Coke’s shares traded between about
$36 and $43/share in 2013.

94

The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 56 (2014 Proxy).
The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57. Coke added a relative total shareholder return metric to its plan
beginning with the 2014-2016 performance period. Id at 58.
96
The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57.
97
The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 68. The exact figures were 97,949, 195,898, and 293,847 shares,
respectively.
98
The Coca-Cola Company, Proxy Statement, at 57.
95
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Of course, Coke’s share price and profit growth at the end of three years are likely to be
correlated. It is possible that Coke could meet or exceed its maximum profit growth target and
suffer a drop in share price – the entire market could crash. It’s also possible that Coke’s profits
could languish and that its shares could rise 25% with an overall market surge. In all probability,
however, low profits growth will be associated with a low share price and high growth with a
high share price. As in the case of the Medtronic’s restricted stock grant, the relationship
between share price at payout and expected payout value is probabilistic. The following figure
illustrates one possibility. Simply for illustration, I have assumed that at a share price of $20 or
below, it is highly unlikely that the threshold profit growth target will have been met. At a share
price of $60 or beyond, I assume that the maximum target will have almost surely been met. In
between, I assume an increasing likelihood that Coke will have achieved threshold, target, and
maximum performance levels with increasing ex post share prices. In this hypothetical case, the
relationship between share price at payout and the expected value of the CEO’s PSUs is
described by the solid line in the following figure.
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The most important thing to note here is the multiplier effect. As long as the
performance measure and share price are correlated, higher performance levels result in the
issuance of more shares and more valuable shares. This leverage effect is not a feature of
conventional time-vested restricted stock. Also note the impact of the threshold performance
level. The award is valueless (ex post) unless and until a minimum performance level is
achieved. In combination, these features produce an economic relationship between share price
and payoff that is very similar to that of an option, and this payoff profile more closely resembles
the familiar “hockey stick” payoff profile associated with option compensation. The option
lives!
BBCK have confirmed that performance-vesting conditions attached to restricted stock
grants magnify the incentives created by these instruments.99 They analyzed the incentive
properties of performance share units employing absolute metrics issued by a sample of large
public companies between 1998 and 2008. BBCK found that the addition of one accountingbased metric, similar to the Coke plan, increased the delta of awards by an average of 72%.100
BBCK also found that performance share plans with a single accounting-based metric delivered
substantial vega, whereas conventional time-vested restricted stock grants create no vega.101

99

BBCK (2013).
BBCK (2013) at 65 (table 6, panel C).
101
BBCK (2013) at 67 (table 7, panel C). See supra note x and accompanying text for discussion of delta and vega.
100
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b. Relative Metrics
Increasingly, performance share plans measure performance relative to that of a peer
group or the overall market.102 Total shareholder return (TSR) – the increase in a company’s
stock price plus dividends over some period – is a popular metric for performance share plans,
and the large majority of TSR plans employ a relative measure of TSR.103 Aside from the
comparative feature, the mechanics of these plans are generally quite similar to the Coca-Cola
plan we just reviewed. CenturyLink, a large telecom company, utilizes a typical relative TSR
plan.104 Under the CenturyLink plan, executives receive performance-vested restricted stock that
vests only if time and variable relative TSR performance hurdles are met.105 The reference group
is the S&P 500. A threshold level of stock will vest after three years if CenturyLink’s TSR over
that period is at the 25th percentile of S&P 500 TSR. 50th percentile TSR performance results in
a target level of stock vesting. 75th percentile TSR performance results in maximum vesting. No
shares vest if CenturyLink’s TSR rank is less than 25th percentile and no additional shares vest
for performance ranking in excess of the 75th percentile. Vesting levels are linearly interpolated
for relative TSR performance between the 25th and 75th percentile. However, while the basic
performance measure is relative shareholder return, there is also an absolute performance
overlay. Under the CenturyLink plan, if absolute TSR over the relevant period is negative, no
more than the target number of shares may vest.106
The threshold, target, and maximum restricted shares issued to CenturyLink’s CEO, Glen
Post, in 2012 were 29,422; 58,844; and 117,688.107 The relationship between CenturyLink’s
relative TSR performance and the number of Post’s shares that will vest in three years (assuming
he remains employed as CEO and the company achieves positive absolute TSR) is portrayed in
the following figure.

102

J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, Jeffrey Coles & Brian Young, The Presence, Value, and Incentive Properties of
Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation Contracts 10 (working paper, Feb, 2014) (hereinafter
BBCY) (finding increased usage of RPE in performance based equity awards in a sample of 750 large companies
between 1998 and 2012 with 37% of firms making RPE awards in 2012, and finding that of firms making
performance-based equity awards in 2012, about half included RPE provisions).
103
Cook (2014) at 12.
104
CenturyLink, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (2013).
105
CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 55.
106
CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 55. It appears from the proxy that the target number of shares is issued to a plan
participant, but that a fewer or greater number of shares will vest depending on performance. This seems to be a
hybrid between a true restricted stock plan and a restricted stock unit plan. The number of shares that is issued
could be important because these shares carry voting rights unless and until forfeited. Id. Accrued dividends are
paid at vesting depending on the number of shares that actually vest. Id.
107
CenturyLink (2013 Proxy) at 54.
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As before, the value of the CEO’s stock award at payout is a function of both relative
TSR performance and share price. CenturyLink’s shares traded between about $37 and
$43/share in 2012. Let’s call it $40/share as a baseline.
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But also as before, the performance measure and share price are correlated. In this case,
TSR and share price are highly correlated. TSR is share price (plus dividends). The
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complication here is that the performance measure isn’t CenturyLink’s absolute TSR
performance, but relative TSR performance.
Let’s begin by assuming that the S&P 500 index is flat over the three year period. In that
case, assuming that CenturyLink pays an average level of dividends, maintaining a $40 share
price over three years should represent 50th percentile TSR performance. A lower share price
would place CenturyLink in the bottom half of performers. For illustration, let’s assume that a
$30 share price (a 25% drop) represents 25th percentile TSR performance relative to the S&P
500. Conversely, let’s assume that a 25% increase in CenturyLink’s share price to $50/share
represents 75th percentile performance. The relationship between share price and value to Post at
payout in this illustrative case is portrayed in the following figure.108
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So far, the picture at CenturyLink looks very similar to that at Coca-Cola, but recall that
CenturyLink employs a relative TSR metric. Suppose that the S&P 500 index rises by 25% over
the three year performance period. Now for CenturyLink to maintain 50th percentile TSR
performance (again assuming average dividend yields), its share price must rise by 25% to
$50/share. Under an absolute TSR plan, an increase to $50/share might have yielded maximum
vesting; under a relative TSR plan in a bull market, only target vesting. The relationship
between share price and value under these two scenarios (flat S&P 500 and S&P 500 up 25%) is
portrayed here. Again, the exact relationship between performance and percentiles is unknown.
This graph is purely for illustration.
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expected payoffs.
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Of course, the S&P 500 can also decline over the performance period, in which case
simply maintaining a $40 share price at CenturyLink would represent superior performance.
Under this relative TSR plan, participants would indeed receive more shares and more value for
maintaining a flat $40 share price when the S&P 500 is down 25% than in scenarios in which the
S&P is flat or rising, as seen here.
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This, of course, is the point to using relative TSR performance in these plans. Relative
TSR plans increase the linkage between pay and firm-specific performance. Executives are
rewarded or penalized to a much lesser degree for overall market rises or declines than they
would be under an absolute TSR plan, or, for that matter, if they held conventional options.
By now, it may be apparent that a relative TSR performance share plan is very similar
economically to an indexed stock option – an option with an exercise price that rises or falls with
the rise or fall in an index.109 The relative TSR plan here is similar to an option with a strike
price that rises or falls with the S&P 500 share index.

B. Performance-Based Option Plans
The option analogs of performance-accelerated and performance-vested stock are
occasionally used by large public companies. Performance-accelerated options were more
commonly observed in the late 1990’s/early 2000’s than performance-accelerated restricted
stock, but these instruments have virtually disappeared today.110 80 firms in BBCK’s sample
(6%) issued performance-accelerated options in 1999, but only one firm did so in 2012.111
Vesting of performance-vested options is made contingent on the satisfaction of
performance criteria as well as the passage of time.112 As with performance-vested restricted
stock, performance metrics may include a variety of share price or accounting-based measures,
and measurement may be made on an absolute or relative basis. While more common than
performance-accelerated options today, these instruments are much less frequently observed than
performance-based stock. In BBCK’s sample, only 59 of the firms in BCK’s sample (5%) issued
performance-vested options in 2012.113
Conventional stock options already provide executives with significant incentives to
increase shareholder value (delta) and to increase volatility, perhaps by taking on risky projects
(vega). However, BBCK found that adding performance-vesting conditions to options
substantially increased both delta and vega.114

C. Performance Cash Plans
Adding to the heterogeneity of modern executive pay design, a small number of firms
utilize multi-year cash-based performance plans. These plans incorporate performance metrics –
accounting and/or share value based – that are similar to those observed with performance share
plans, and performance measurement may be done on an absolute or relative basis. The BBCK
109
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BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A).
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BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A).
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Hay Group (2013) at 20. For an example of a performance-vested option plan, see HP’s 2015 proxy statement at
pages 64 to 65 (describing vesting conditions for performance-contingent stock options based on share price
appreciation or alternatively relative TSR performance).
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BBCK (2013) at 58 (Table 2, Panel A).
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Holding the value of the grant constant, BBCK found that adding one accounting (stock price) metric increased
delta by 97% (30%) and increased vega by 314% (42%). BBCK (2013) at 64-67 (Tables 6 & 7).
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study did not include performance-cash plans, but the Hay Group’s recent study indicates that
16% of the 300 firms studied made performance cash grants in 2012 (versus 78% issuing
performance-based stock and 5% issuing performance-based options).115 In addition, single year
cash-based performance plans are a very common element of executives’ annual incentive
packages.
Cash performance plans also provide incentives (direct or indirect) to increase
shareholder value. However, they lack the leverage associated with the variable share
performance share plans that have evolved as the single most important element, in aggregate, in
top executive pay at the largest U.S. firms. Given that fact, the remainder of this paper will focus
on the benefits, and potential burdens, of performance-based stock plans. To some extent,
however, the benefits of performance-vested options and performance cash plans, and the
concerns, are analogous to those of performance-based stock.

IV. Performance-Based Executive Compensation – An Initial Assessment
A. Advantages of Performance-Based Stock Plans
Performance-based stock plans have several features that make them attractive as
incentive compensation for senior executives. Chief among these is flexibility.
As we have seen, although they are nominally stock plans, performance-based stock
plans can be designed to provide the kinds of high-powered incentives that we associate with
options – strong incentives to increase share prices and incentives to take on risk. In their recent
work, BBCK find that the aggregate vega (the risk-taking incentive associated with
compensation) provided by performance-vesting conditions attached to senior executive stock
and option grants more than made up for the aggregate decline in conventional stock option use
in the mid-2000s and the vega associated with these options.116 In earlier work, Hayes,
Lemmon, and Qiu had found little evidence that the decline in option use in the mid-2000s was
associated with firms adopting less risky financial and investment policies.117 This was
surprising, and Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu interpreted their findings as suggesting that the riskinducing properties, or “convexity”, of options actually does little to align manager incentives
with shareholder preferences with respect to risk.118 But an alternative explanation, supported by
BBCK’s evidence, is that the aggregate level of convexity has been maintained, just with a
different form of compensation.119
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Performance-based compensation utilizing relative performance metrics explicitly adopts
relative performance evaluation, a feature of long-proposed, but very rarely observed, indexed
options. As we’ve noted, adding RPE to compensation contracts should increase efficiency by
better focusing pay on performance within managerial control. As a substitute for conventional
options, relative performance-based plans can maintain high powered incentives while
eliminating windfalls from bull markets and mitigating the problem of a bear market
undermining those incentives.120 To be sure, commentators have suggested some reasons, aside
from accounting and tax, that firms might forego the opportunity to index options, but none of
these is terribly convincing.121 The ability to explicitly incorporate RPE into incentive contracts
is a clear plus for performance-based equity pay.
Performance share plans also can be designed to be effectively in-, at-, or out-of-themoney. Recall that an at-the-money option is issued with strike price equal to the market price
of the stock at the date of grant. The stock price must increase for the award to have value ex
post. Ignoring upward drift in share prices, as well as value-enhancing steps taken by the firm,
one could think of an at-the-money option as one with a 50/50 chance of being exercised in the
money.122 And one could think of a performance share plan in which there is a 50/50 chance of
vesting as also being “at-the-money.”
Consider the Medtronic performance-vested restricted stock plan. Given the lack of
variable share levels – it’s all or nothing – this plan is based on relatively easily achievable
performance hurdles.123 The probability of these shares vesting is significantly greater than 50%.
Economically, this is similar to a far in-the-money stock option. If the shares are almost certain
to vest, the value of the award rises and falls with the underlying share price.
The relative total shareholder return (TSR) plan operated by CenturyLink is also
analogous to an in-the-money option.124 Recall that CenturyLink need only achieve 25th
percentile TSR performance for a threshold level of shares to vest. A higher target level of
shares vests with 50th percentile performance. All else equal, there should be a 50/50 chance of
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achieving 50th percentile performance and the inclusion of a lower threshold target puts this
instrument in the money at grant.125
In their study of performance share plans employing absolute performance metrics
between 1998 and 2008, BBCK found that threshold performance was actually achieved in only
47% of the cases.126 53% of the time, no shares vested. On average, then, these plans seemed to
be slightly out-of-the-money, at least in hindsight. We do not have analogous ex post data for
relative performance share plans, but one might expect that these plans are more likely to be
equivalent to in-the-money options simply because of the common practice of using 50th
percentile performance as a target for relative performance, with lower and higher percentiles
equating to threshold and maximum performance. This supposition is bolstered by simulations
conducted by BBCY predicting that threshold performance in RPE plans will be achieved in 6976% of cases and that target performance would be achieved in 48-53% of cases.127
There is nothing inherently objectionable about in-the-money pay instruments. As noted
above, researchers have found that in-the-money design is optimal in certain circumstances.128
The advantages of an in-the-money design are that payouts are more certain and that the
instrument continues to provide useful incentives over a greater range of ups and downs in
company and market performance. Of course, in-the-money instruments are more costly to grant
than at- or out-of-the-money instruments, so fewer of these instruments should be issued, all else
being equal.
The overall theme here is that performance share plans offer tremendous flexibility in
design that allow firms to issue pay instruments across the “moneyness” spectrum and,
importantly, to mimic indexed options with relative performance metrics, as we saw with the
CenturyLink plan. There are two reasons that performance share plans are more flexible than
conventional stock and options. First, the moneyness of a performance share unit – particularly
one employing absolute performance metrics – is not as obvious as it is with conventional equity.
Absent backdating or other fraud, a conventional executive stock option issued by a company
with publicly traded shares is clearly and transparently issued at-, in-, or out-of-the-money. The
“moneyness” of a conventional option is almost impossible to conceal. One need only compare
the option exercise price with the current stock market price to determine the moneyness. But
employees who might object to receiving an out-of-the-money conventional stock option are
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unlikely to realize that a performance share plan like Coke’s, for example, is effectively out of
the money.129 Of course, there’s a cost to this opacity, which will be explored below.
Second, the tax constraints that bar in-the-money and indexed options do not bar their
effective replication with performance shares. This is a technical point, but it is important in
practice. Under IRC § 409A, vested deferred compensation (broadly defined) that runs afoul of
certain requirements is currently includable in income and subject to a 20% penalty tax.130
Congress enacted § 409A in an effort to combat what it viewed as improper deferrals of income
for tax purposes. One particular concern was that executives had too much control of the timing
of the receipt of their deferred compensation.131 Although stock options could be viewed as
providing for deferral of compensation and could have been fully subjected to § 409A, the
regulations provide a safe harbor exclusions for options.132 But the option safe harbor does not
apply to in-the-money or indexed options. It applies only if “the exercise price may never be less
than the fair market value of the underlying stock… on the date the option is granted.”133 In-themoney options are issued with an exercise price less than fair market value at grant, so they
obviously violate this restriction, and indexed options may have an exercise price less than fair
market value at grant (if the index moves down), so these instruments fall out of the safe harbor,
as well.
Deferred compensation that is not within a safe harbor – including in-the-money options,
indexed options, and performance share plans – is subject to the rules of § 409A. Options are
problematic under § 409A because the employee controls the timing of exercise. This is not a
permissible distribution under § 409A, which allows penalty-free distributions from deferred
compensation plans only in the events of death, disability, a predetermined fixed distribution
date, change in control, and unforeseeable emergency.134 Because performance share plans have
a certain payout date, they do not result in impermissible distributions, and thus firms utilizing
performance share plans need not worry about particular design features (e.g., moneyness) that
otherwise could trigger the penalty tax.135
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Of course, performance share plans provide flexibility in other ways as well. While
conventional stock and options tie rewards directly to share prices, and share prices only,
performance share plans can include other performance metrics. The scope to do so is unlimited.
While the ultimate (economic) concern of investors is share price, it is conceivable that tying
executive rewards more directly to sales growth, EPS, and similar metrics over the medium term
is a more effective way of achieving high shareholder returns than focusing directly and
exclusively on share prices. This idea relates back to the concept that the most efficient
incentive schemes tie rewards to performance that is within the managers’ control.136 Managers
have more control over sales and earnings than over the price of their stock, particularly given
swings in the market, so using alternative metrics in performance share plans could represent an
improvement, although, to be sure, relative TSR plans also eliminate the risk of market price
swings from executive pay contracts.
Consistent with this rosy view, BBCK provide evidence that the issuance of
performance-based equity awards is consistent with “contracting to promote CEO fit, incentive
alignment, and sorting.”137

B. Challenges Raised by Performance-Based Equity Pay
The flexibility of performance share plans is both a feature and a bug. Often these plans
are highly complex, and grant date valuation is difficult even for the simplest of performance
share plans. In addition, in some ways performance share plans are more gameable than
conventional stock and option compensation. Another current problem with performance share
plans is that the accounting treatment differs significantly depending on the metrics utilized,
likely leading to accounting-driven design choices. Moreover, neither of the currently applicable
accounting regimes is likely to produce reported compensation expense that matches the
expected or actual value transferred to executives.
1. Heterogeneity, Complexity, and Related Challenges
Observed performance share plans rely on a broad range of performance measures,
including both share price-related metrics and accounting-based metrics, such as profit, capital
efficiency, revenue, and cash flow measures. Within each of the accounting-based metric
categories, one can find many different specific metrics. For example, profit measures include
EPS, EBITDA, net income, operating income, pre-tax profit, etc.138 Some plans adopt a single
performance metric; other plans utilize several metrics.139 Moreover, as we have seen, some of
these plans base payouts on absolute performance, while others measure performance relative to
exercise and sale of the underlying shares, which may be a low salience means of boosting executive pay. I thank
Gregg Polsky for highlighting this issue.
136
See supra note x and accompanying text.
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equity plans in 2013. See supra note x and accompanying text.
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a peer group.140 It is very difficult to find two performance share plans with the same metrics.
While this variety of approaches may reflect optimal matching of incentive schemes with firms,
it makes firm-to-firm comparisons extremely difficult.
Adding to the comparability problem is the inherent difficulty of estimating the value of
performance share grants ex ante. Compare conventional options. Several well-accepted
valuation methods for conventional options have been developed over the years and are
recognized as acceptable techniques by FASB.141 Many firms utilize Black-Scholes option
valuation methodology. Black-Scholes is not a perfect fit for non-transferable, compensatory
stock options, but by substituting an expected holding period for the contract term of a traded
option, Black-Scholes provides a reasonable estimate of ex ante value (as well as of option delta
and vega, which are important measures of incentive properties). 142 Other firms utilize binomial
or lattice models to value compensatory options, while still others rely on Monte Carlo
simulations. These are all accepted valuation methods for compensatory options.
To be sure, the outputs from these models are only as good as the inputs, and firms have
significant discretion in selecting assumptions with respect to stock price volatility, interest rates,
and dividend yields. Not surprisingly, firms tend to use this discretion to reduce the reported
grant date “fair value” of executive stock options.143 Nonetheless, as a result of option valuation
innovations over the last several decades, observers are now able to calculate and firms are
required to disclose a reasonably accurate and verifiable grant date value for a class of
instruments that recently accounted for more than half of aggregate executive pay at large public
companies.
The substitution of performance-based equity for conventional options represents a step
backward, at least initially, in terms of accuracy of valuation and disclosure of executive pay.
Some stock option valuation methods can be adapted to the valuation of performance share plans
that are based solely on stock price or stock market measures.144 For example, CenturyLink uses
a Monte Carlo simulation to generate ex ante values for grants made under its relative TSR
140
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plan.145 But valuing grants made under a relative TSR plan is more complex than valuing a
conventional option. Different and potentially more manipulable assumptions are required –
such as the cross-volatility between a firm’s share price and that of the relevant index or basket
of stocks.
The grant date valuation difficulties increase substantially when accounting-based
performance measures are added to the mix. Apparently, the FASB has concluded that there is
currently no reliable approach for calculating the value of these instruments ex ante.146 As a
result, the FASB has adopted a different approach to accounting for these instruments, which
does not require any adjustment to grant date “fair value” on account of the incorporation of such
hurdles.147 Instead, firms are required to estimate the number of shares that are most probable to
vest given the performance hurdle. This approach, which provides firms with tremendous
discretion over reported executive pay levels, is further discussed below.148
The bottom line is that grant date valuation of performance-based equity grants is not
highly reliable. It is significantly less reliable than ex ante valuation of conventional options.
And we should not expect misreporting to be random. Firms will tend to use discretion in
choosing valuation methods and assumptions to reduce, not increase, reported executive
compensation and overall firm compensation expense. For example, in their study of
performance share plans employing absolute performance metrics between 1998 and 2008,
BBCK found that the median firm underreported the ex ante value of share price-based grants by
25%.149 One pay consultant describes relative total shareholder return plans, such as the plan
utilized by CenturyLink, as being “expense efficient,” meaning that the expense that must be
reported under GAAP is relatively low compared with the value delivered to the executives.150
At least they are honest about it.
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The added difficulty and unreliability of valuation are not totally unexpected. Not all
performance-based plans include RPE, but introducing RPE does necessarily complicate matters.
Valuing the indexed options proposed by Rappaport and others back in the 1990s would also
have been more complex than valuing conventional compensatory options. Nonetheless, the
retrograde move is troubling for several reasons.
First, as suggested above, difficulty in valuing performance-based equity grants ex ante
makes it much more challenging to compare heterogeneous pay packages being granted to
different executives at different firms, which undermines any market-based discipline being
imposed on executive pay. Second, investors cannot be certain of the level of compensation
being paid to their senior managers. The true expected value of this compensation is likely to be
greater than firms report in their proxy statements. The SEC has recently announced rules
implementing the Dodd-Frank requirement that firms disclose the ratio between CEO pay and
median employee pay.151 Like others,152 I am skeptical that this innovation will do much to
moderate executive pay, but I am also skeptical that the CEO pay figures – based on reported
grant date compensation153 – will be accurate for CEOs receiving performance-based equity
pay.154 Third, absent a tool like Black-Scholes, it is difficult for directors, investors, and
participants to understand the impact of adjustments to plan terms – the tradeoffs between plan
length, the number, type, and aggressiveness of performance hurdles, etc.
Moving away from valuation issues per se, investors and regulators also should be
concerned that the complexity and opacity of these plans leads to gaming by boards and
executives. The choice of a particular performance metric may reflect optimal matching of
incentive to executive, but it could also reflect inside information on the part of executives.155
Suppose, for example, that the CEO of Acme believes that the firm’s chronic under-performance
with respect to sales is likely to be reversed during the next several years as a result of a number
of long-term initiatives. A performance share plan based on relative sales performance would be
just the ticket for the CEO and the executive team. Everyone might be happy ex post with the
improved sales performance and the corresponding executive compensation, but only the
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executives would realize that the performance hurdle was relatively unambitious under the
circumstances. Similar gaming could take place with respect to the peer group selected for
relative performance evaluation. There is evidence that executive compensation peer group
members are selected with an eye towards justifying higher CEO pay.156 There is little reason to
think that cherry picking of this type does not take place in designing performance share plans
that incorporate relative performance metrics.
Another game that firms and executives could play would be to create purposefully
complex and opaque performance-based equity plans that would increase their ability to report
low values for executive pay. This gaming opportunity will be discussed more fully in the
following section.
2. Accounting for Compensation Expense Arising from Performance-Based
Executive Pay
The accounting treatment of performance shares is important for two reasons. First, that
treatment determines the magnitude of the single largest component, in aggregate, of executive
pay as reported in the key summary compensation table in company proxy statements. The SEC
mandates disclosure of the grant date value of all elements of executive pay, but the FASB
determines how the “fair value” of performance shares and other equity pay awards is to be
calculated. For better or worse, that table now serves as the primary benchmark for discussions
of executive pay, case by case, and market wide. The second reason that the accounting
treatment matters is that performance equity is not limited to the executive suite. At IBM, for
example, over 500 executives receive performance shares.157 While CEO pay gets all the press,
aggregate executive pay has a greater impact on reported earnings. Thus, firms are likely to care
about the magnitude of grant date CEO/senior executive pay as well as firm-wide compensation
expense, both at grant and as ultimately recorded in the books.
At present, two different accounting regimes may apply to performance share plans
depending on the type of performance measures employed.158 Although the differences are not
as stark as the pre-2006 difference between stock option accounting and accounting for other
forms of compensation, this difference may be large enough to influence plan design. More
importantly, both of the current regimes encourage under-valuation and under-reporting of
executive pay, a problem that already existed with respect to conventional options, but is
heightened with performance-based equity. It may be time to change course and adopt mark-tomarket accounting for these instruments and for equity pay generally.
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Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer
Groups, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 257 (2010) (finding that “firms appear to select highly paid peers to justify their CEO
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Under US GAAP, accounting for equity compensation is governed by ASC Topic 718.159
These rules first distinguish between equity awards and liability awards.160 Grants that are
settled with stock are equity awards.161 Equity awards include conventional options and
restricted stock, and performance-based stock and options. Cash settled grants are liability
awards.162 Liability awards included cash-settled stock appreciation rights (SARs)163 and cashsettled performance plans, which were briefly discussed above.164
Under ASC Topic 718, liability awards are accounted for on a mark-to-market basis.165 I
will return to mark-to-market accounting shortly. For equity awards, compensation cost arising
from an award is set equal to the fair value of the award at grant (less any amount paid for the
award), and is not subsequently adjusted unless the award is modified.166 However, this cost,
and the way it is recorded as an expense, differs depending on the performance measure used.167
In cases in which performance measures consist solely of share price or market metrics,
such as CenturyLink’s relative TSR plan, firms are required to calculate a fair value at grant,
reflecting the market condition, using an appropriate model, such as a Monte Carlo simulation.168
Firms must use reasonable and supportable estimates of share price volatility, interest rates, and
expected dividends as model inputs.169 The fair value that is calculated in this fashion is
expensed ratably over the performance period.170 The value is not updated over time to reflect
new information on the likelihood that the conditions will be satisfied, but it is adjusted for the
number of shares expected not to vest because of failure to meet retention requirements.171 This
is essentially the same accounting treatment that applies to conventional stock options. FASB
refers to performance measures of this type as “market conditions,” and I will refer to the
corresponding accounting treatment as “market condition accounting” or the “market condition
method.”
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See generally, Frederic W. Cook & Co., Accounting for Stock Compensation under FASB ASC Topic 718 (Sept.
12, 2013) (hereinafter Cook (ASC 718)) for an overview of these accounting rules. See generally,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Guide to Accounting for Stock-based Compensation; A Multidisciplinary Approach
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If performance share awards include only an accounting-based performance condition,
such as Coca-Cola’s profit growth metric, the accounting treatment is quite different. The grant
date “fair value” that is calculated for the award is not reduced to reflect the probability that the
award will not vest as a result of the performance condition.172 The “fair value” per share is not
an estimate of the fair value of the award at grant at all; it is simply the share price prevailing on
the grant date.173 However, firms are required only to recognize an expense with respect to
shares that are probable to vest.174 At grant this is often the number of shares equating to
“target” performance. And any expense previously recognized for a share that was once deemed
probable to vest is reversed if later it is no longer probable that the share will vest.175 In this
situation, a share may not be probable to vest either because of the accounting-based
performance condition or because of the retention requirement.176 Somewhat confusingly, FASB
refers to performance measures of this type as “performance conditions.”177 I will refer to the
corresponding accounting treatment as “performance condition accounting” or the “performance
condition method.”
A performance share plan may incorporate both market conditions and accounting-based
“performance conditions.” In such a case a grant date fair value would be determined using an
appropriate model that incorporates the impact of the market condition. Then, that fixed value
per share would be multiplied by the number of shares that were deemed probable to vest at
various points in time taking into account the accounting-based condition in order to generate the
compensation expense recognized by the firm.178
a. Performance Condition Accounting
Although performance shares may include both market-based vesting hurdles and
accounting-based hurdles, we will first consider the accounting issues associated with awards
that include only one of these two types of conditions, beginning with accounting-based
performance conditions. Presumably, FASB’s failure to require firms to model and calculate a
true grant date fair value for awards that incorporate accounting-based performance conditions
172

ASC 718-10-30-12, 13; PWC at 1-21; Cook (ASC 718) at 7.
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reflects skepticism that these awards can be valued accurately.179 However, the performance
condition method provides firms with a great deal of discretion in reporting grant date executive
pay and, depending on the payout structure, may result in a downward bias in expected
compensation expense firm wide.
i. Structural Bias
Consider the following simplified relative performance share plan. After three years,
Acme’s CEO will receive 50,000 shares if the company achieves 25th percentile relative
performance, 100,000 shares for 50th percentile performance, and 150,000 shares for 75th
percentile performance, with the share award linearly interpolated between 25th and 75th
percentile performance. To simplify, we’ll assume that Acme’s share price at grant is $2/share,
that share price and relative performance are tightly correlated, and that the overall market is flat
over the three years, such that Acme’s achieving 50th percentile performance would be
associated with a $2/share stock price at payout as well as at grant.180 We will also assume that
Acme’s Time 2 share price is a linear function of percentile performance, ranging from $1/share
at 0 percentile performance to $3/share at 100th percentile performance.181 These assumptions
are summarized in the following table:
Relative
Performance at
Time 2
0 Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
100th Percentile

#
of
Vesting
0
50,000
100.000
150,000
150,000

Shares Share Price
Time 1
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2

at Expected Share
Price at Time 2
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00

I have not specified the nature of the performance condition, and, of course, that’s critical
under ASC 718. Let’s first assume that Acme’s plan is based on relative earnings per share
(EPS) performance. Given the inclusion of that accounting-based performance condition (and no
“market condition”), the “fair value” of the shares will be the grant date value of $2/share.
Recall that the “fair value” per share under this approach is simply the share price at grant.
Expense recognition is based on that fair value and the number of shares that are probable to
vest.182 If the most probable outcome at grant is 50th percentile performance, Acme will begin
accruing $200,000 of compensation expense. Over time, as Acme’s performance improves or
179

See BBCK (2013) at 24, 29 (noting that techniques for valuing awards with accounting-based performance
metrics “are undeveloped or nonexistent”).
180
In addition to assuming that the market is flat over the performance period, I am assuming there is no time value
difference between grant and payout. A more complicated model would include upward drift in share prices and a
discount factor based on borrowing costs.
181
The exact figures selected for this illustration are unimportant, but it is important that the share price increases
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Supra.
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regresses versus its competitors, Acme will update its expense calculation if another scenario
becomes the most probable scenario, but no direct adjustment will be made for changes in share
price. Ultimately, however, the expense associated with this grant will be the product of
$2/share (the “fair value” at grant) and the number of shares that actually vest. That final
expense is represented by the heavily dashed line in the following figure and is labeled
“performance condition accounting.”

The realized value of this grant, represented by the solid line in the figure, reflects the
leverage associated with performance share plans under which superior performance is linked to
both more shares and more valuable shares, and inferior performance is linked to fewer, and less
valuable shares. Under these assumptions, performance condition accounting results in a
downward bias in expected compensation expense. Of course, we do not know what level of
performance ultimately will be achieved, but if we assume a normal distribution of outcomes
centered on 50th percentile performance, it is obvious by inspection that the extent to which the
performance condition accounting expense exceeds realized values between 25th and 50th
percentile performance is more than offset by the extent to which realized values exceed the
performance condition accounting expense between 50th and 75th percentile performance. In
addition, while outcomes below 25th and above 75th percentile performance may be relatively
rare, low outcomes result in no gap between performance condition method expense and realized
values (since both are zero), while high outcomes result in significant under-valuation under the
performance condition method.
Now imagine a plan identical in all ways except that the performance measure adopted is
relative total shareholder return (TSR), a market condition under ASC 718. In this situation,
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Acme would use a model to determine the fair value of the grant incorporating the relative TSR
hurdle. If Acme adopts unbiased model inputs, presumably the fair value under this approach
would be the realized values in the figure multiplied by the probability of their occurrence.183
Acme would be required to expense that amount uniformly over the vesting period, regardless of
which, if any, of the performance conditions is ultimately achieved.184 Rarely would the CEO’s
realized value match the compensation expense recognized by Acme, but there is no structural
bias inherent in market condition accounting. Again, assuming that the simulation inputs are
unbiased, an assumption we will relax below, simulation-based approaches produce unbiased
compensation expense recognition.
Given the structure of the hypothesized performance share plan and my assumptions,
expected compensation expense is less than the executive’s expected realization.185 But what
about grant date executive pay reporting? Assuming unbiased assumptions, the amount of grant
date compensation disclosed would be more than the expected expense but could be more or less
than the expected realized payout. In the example above, assuming 50th percentile performance
is most probable at grant date, $200,000 of compensation would be reported for the CEO. But
the expected value of the dashed, performance condition accounting line is less than $200,000.
That expected value would be exactly $200,000 if 50,000 shares vested between 0 percentile and
25th percentile performance.186 That would produce complete symmetry in the dashed line. But
instead we have the “hockey stick” payout profile with no shares vesting until threshold
performance is achieved. On the other hand, it is clear that the expected value of realized pay
exceeds the expected expense. Whether that difference partially, perfectly, or over-fills the lowend gap depends on plan details. It is possible that firms disclosing grant-date values for
performance share plans using this method are over-reporting executive pay levels. This
phenomenon could explain, in part, BBCK’s findings that firms in their sample tended to
disclose performance share plan compensation, involving a single accounting-based metric, that
exceeded their simulated values.187
ii. Grant Date Discretion
The structural bias inherent in the performance condition accounting method described
above results in expected compensation expense being less than the expected realized value of
the pay award. Minimizing this expected expense would be of interest to firms that issue
183

The expected realized value would be discounted to the grant date to determine “fair value,” but in this simplified
example I am ignoring time value differences between grant and payout. See supra.
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ASC 718-10-35-2. See also, PWC at 1-24; Cook at 7.
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Of course, performance share plans do not necessarily exhibit these features. As we have seen, one of the
advantages of performance share plans is the tremendous flexibility to customize metrics to create whatever
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performance condition method results in expected compensation expense in excess of expected realized value. But
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condition method is essentially elective (through choice of performance metrics), one would expect that most firms
using the performance condition method are reporting systematically low compensation expense figures.
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performance shares widely and are concerned about minimizing aggregate compensation
expense and maximizing reported earnings. But as we have seen, the impact of this structural
bias on the reported level of executive pay at grant is ambiguous.
But for firms focused on minimizing disclosed grant date CEO pay, another feature of
performance condition accounting looms large. This feature gives firms tremendous discretion,
really unaccountable discretion, in proxy statement disclosure of ex ante executive pay.
ASC 718 instructs firms not to adjust the “fair value” of awards for the existence of
performance conditions, such as the accounting-based performance metrics we have discussed.
In cases in which awards carry no “market condition,” the “fair value” of awards with
performance conditions is simply the grant date stock price. But the associated compensation
expense is this fair value multiplied by the number of shares probable to vest.188 Ultimately, this
will be a certain, totally transparent figure for each grant, but at the time of the grant and in the
interim between grant and vesting, firms have tremendous discretion in determining the number
of shares probable to vest, and the FASB provides no specific guidance on this point.
As PricewaterhouseCoopers notes, interpretation of the term “probable” in this context
should be consistent with other FASB guidance suggesting that probable means “likely to
occur.”189 But as PWC also notes, management judgment is required in determining whether
performance conditions are likely to be achieved and, if so, at what level.190
Coca-Cola’s approach appears to be typical. The value of performance shares reported in
its summary executive compensation table is the product of the share price at grant and the
number of shares that will vest if target performance is achieved.191 By implication, the
compensation committee has determined that it is most probable that this level of profits growth
will be achieved during the three-year performance period. As is typical, there is no discussion
in Coke’s proxy statement or 10K of the basis for this particular determination.
A firm intent on minimizing reported executive pay (vis-a-vis expected compensation)
would use this discretion to adopt undisclosed assumptions minimizing the most probable
performance level achievement at grant. If it turns out later that performance exceeds that
prediction, the executives will prosper and, indeed, the realized compensation will be reported
elsewhere in the proxy statement, but the disclosure of grant date pay will remain low.
I certainly do not mean to suggest that Coca-Cola has adopted this strategy. Just the
opposite appears to have been true in recent years, at least. Coke bases grant date disclosures on
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target performance levels, but it has failed to achieve that level of performance for several
years.192 Coke recently has over reported grant date pay, at least in hindsight.
BBCK report that between 1998 and 2008, firms generally over-reported the grant date
value of awards incorporating accounting-based metrics (relative to their own simulations). As
we have seen, one reason might be that the application of the performance condition accounting
approach to “hockey stick” award structures results in “most probable” grant date valuation
exceeding expected payoffs.193 Another reason might be that firms are setting target levels of
performance that are something of a stretch. Recall, that awards pay off, albeit at lower levels, if
threshold performance targets are achieved. But if firms substitute target performance for
“probable” performance at grant date, these stretch targets would result in over-reported grant
date pay under this method. But there is no reason that firms cannot set stretch targets and report
grant date executive pay based on more probable, even easily achievable, levels of performance.
Ultimately, some number of shares (possibly zero) will vest. Firms will have zero
discretion over the ultimate compensation cost associated with performance share plans
including only performance conditions. However, as long as observers focus primarily on the
grant date value of executive pay packages, the discretion described above could be immensely
attractive to firms with concerns about perceived levels of executive pay.
b. Market Condition Accounting
I argued above that the market condition accounting approach, which the FASB requires
for performance share plans incorporating a share-price or market metric, produces an unbiased
fair value as long as the inputs are unbiased.194 But there is reason to suspect that firms will
adopt biased assumptions that result in systematically under-valued compensation. As noted
above, firms have discretion in their choice of assumptions that feed into the models used to
value instruments under a simulation-based accounting regime, and currently those assumptions
are not being uniformly subjected to public scrutiny.195 Firms may employ favorable
assumptions that would not stand up to close examination. In contrast to performance condition
accounting, the under-valuation that results from opportunistic selection of assumptions is
permanent. It affects reported grant date executive pay figures as well as the ultimate expense
charged against earnings.
There is evidence that firms granting conventional stock options use their discretion in
selecting assumptions with respect to stock price volatility, interest rates, and dividend yields to
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reduce the grant date fair value of these options.196 The scope to do so with respect to
performance shares is even greater. Depending on the metric, more assumptions and less
standard assumptions are required. For a relative TSR plan, for example, a firm would not only
need an assumption as to share price volatility, but also the cross-volatility between its share
price and those of its peer group, a more obscure figure that would be more difficult to confirm.
Moreover, the choice of plan metrics is unlikely to be random. Firms and managers may
use inside information to select performance targets that are more easily achieved than they
would appear to be to an uninformed observer. For instance, in my example above, the insiders
may have reason to believe that the firm is likely to outperform its peers in total shareholder
return over the relevant period such that the actual, informed probability of achieving 50th or 75th
percentile performance is greater than random walk analysis would suggest. If so, the
simulation-based market condition accounting approach, employing the stated probabilities,
would produce an artificially low “fair value.” Moreover, given the flexibility, opacity, and
incentives to minimize reported compensation expense, we would expect under-valuation to be
systematic, although perhaps not universal.
As noted above, BBCK found significant under-reporting of grant date compensation
expense for a sample of share-price contingent performance awards granted between 1998 and
2012 by 750 large US companies. Reported compensation expense was 20% less than BBCK’s
simulated valuations.197
c. How About Both?
In combination, the forgoing sections suggest that the optimal strategy for an aggressive
firm wishing to minimize expected and reported executive compensation expense would be to
adopt a performance share plan with both market and accounting-based performance conditions.
Consider, for example, CEO performance shares that vest only if both EPS and TSR hurdles are
satisfied (the hurdles don’t have to be very high). Given the TSR hurdle, the issuer would be
required to use a model to determine the grant date fair value of the award, incorporating the
TSR hurdle but ignoring the EPS hurdle. That exercise provides the opportunity for an
aggressive firm to select model inputs that will yield a downward-biased fair value at grant. The
initial expense associated with this grant and reported in the all important summary
compensation table of the proxy statement will be based on this downward biased “fair value” as
well as the number of shares probable to vest, given the EPS hurdle, which provides another
opportunity for aggressive selection of assumptions. Ultimately, some number of shares will
vest, eliminating discretion along that dimension, but given the structural downward bias
inherent in performance condition accounting, the expected expense associated with such a grant
will be twice reduced – once from the downward biased “fair value” and second by the
asymmetric payout that is not reflected in performance condition accounting.
196
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d. Firm Choice of Plan Design and Accounting Regime
The use of performance shares is on the rise, and design practices are rapidly evolving.
Most plans, however, incorporate multiple metrics and, in all likelihood, both market and
performance conditions.
Among large firms, the single most popular metric for performance share plans is total
shareholder return (TSR). In its survey of compensation practices at 300 large firms, the Hay
Group found that 47% utilized TSR as a performance measure in 2012.198 In more recent
reports, both Frederick W. Cook and Equilar have reported 58% of sample firms utilizing a TSR
measure.199 Both ISS and Glass Lewis have endorsed the use of TSR metrics, particularly
relative TSR, as an effective means of tying compensation to long-term firm performance.200
Given those endorsements, the popularity of TSR metrics is not surprising.
But firms are increasingly utilizing multiple performance measures in their plans. Cook
reports 55% of sample firms utilizing multiple performance measures in 2014, up from 52% in
2012.201 Equilar reports 60% of sample firms utilizing multiple measures,202 while Hay reports
70% of sample firms utilizing multiple performance measures.203
This data does not tell us how many firms are combining market condition accounting
with performance condition accounting, but it is likely to be prevalent. Cook reports that 70% of
the firms in its sample that utilize a TSR metric do so in combination with a one or more
financial metrics. Adopting a TSR metric triggers market condition accounting, while use of
financial metrics would invoke performance condition accounting.
Moreover, despite the enduring popularity of TSR, a market metric, BBCK document the
increasing popularity of accounting-based performance metrics. Between 2006 and 2012, 7580% of the firms in BBCK’s sample that granted performance-based equity incorporated an
accounting-based metric in their plans, up from 55-60% of firms that did so between 1998 and
2002.204 Consistent with these other accounts, accounting-based metrics did not necessarily
displace stock price-based metrics. In BBCK’s sample, use of stock-price metrics declined only
modestly between 1998 and 2012.205
While the trend of adopting multiple performance metrics, and specifically, a
combination of market and accounting-based performance metrics, is consistent with a story of
198
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firms selecting performance hurdles with an eye towards minimizing reported compensation
expense, there are other, more benign explanations that may contribute to the observed
behavior.206
A distinct advantage to the treatment of plans with accounting-based metrics is that this
regime results in zero expense recognition when performance conditions are not met (and the
firm may be suffering generally) and positive expense recognition in situations in which
conditions are satisfied (and the firm may be prospering). This matching or earnings smoothing
may be preferred to the ratable recognition of fair value cost for share price-based performance
shares regardless of ultimate outcomes.207 Core and Packard test whether firms with greater
financial reporting concerns disproportionately adopt accounting-based metrics for their
performance share plans in order to take advantage of this earnings smoothing, but their evidence
does not support this hypothesis.208
Core and Packard also test two other hypotheses consistent with an optimal contracting
explanation for performance share plan design choices – relating to the noisiness of share price
and non-price metrics and stakeholder pressure – but they find no positive support for their
hypotheses.209 By contrast, Li and Wang do find evidence consistent with an optimal contracting
explanation for firms adopting accounting-based performance conditions in long-term incentive
plans,210 and they argue that firms “combine accounting and stock performance measures to
provide more balanced long-term incentives to CEOs.”211
These stories are not mutually exclusive. Some firms may be selecting performance
measures consistent solely with optimal contracting predictions while executive pay disclosure
and/or more general compensation expense management considerations influence others. It
would not be surprising to find firms responding to the availability of a perceived more favorable
accounting treatment. Survey and other evidence indicates that executives are willing to
sacrifice shareholder value to achieve favorable accounting results.212 And while causation has
not been firmly established, it certainly appears in hindsight that the favorable accounting regime
in the 1990s contributed significantly to the boom in the use of stock option compensation.213
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To be sure, the gap between the accounting rules applicable to share price-based and
accounting-based performance plans is less dramatic than the former gap between options and
restricted stock, but it may be shaping behavior, and this would be unfortunate. Compensation
committees should be encouraged to optimize equity incentive plans based on maximizing
shareholder returns, not minimizing reported compensation expense.

C. Tentative Suggestions
The numerous challenges raised by performance-based equity pay can be divided into
three general categories – grant date disclosure and valuation, gaming, and accurate
compensation cost accounting. One common concern is that investors and regulators may not be
receiving an accurate picture of compensation cost, but another is that differences in accounting
treatment or gaming opportunities may drive choices of compensation instruments, resulting only
randomly, at best, in economically efficient incentive systems. Thus, uniformity should be a
goal, as well as accuracy. This section will offer some tentative suggestions in each area.
1. Grant Date Valuation and Executive Pay Disclosure
As we have seen, the grant date valuation and disclosure challenges differ depending on
whether performance equity awards include market conditions, performance conditions, or both.
While valuation of market condition awards is difficult, firms are employing models that
generate a grant date fair value for this class of instruments. Not all, however, disclose sufficient
information to allow an analyst to replicate the valuation. CenturyLink, for example, reports in
its proxy statement that “the value of performance-based restricted shares [is] based on Monte
Carlo simulations in accordance with SEC rules.”214 Although a description of material
assumptions is promised in the notes to financial statements, little additional information is
provided there.215 We are not given the assumptions regarding the distributions of volatility of
CenturyLink shares or the S&P 500, interest rates, etc. Certainly, we are not provided with the
results of the Monte Carlo simulations, aside from a final point estimate of fair value. It is not
clear whether the paucity of disclosure reflects weak requirements or non-compliance with more
stringent requirements, but disclosure of the underlying valuation assumptions would allow
investors and other observers to judge whether and to what extent firms are minimizing reported
executive pay levels by making opportunistic assumptions.216 The FASB should revisit the
disclosure mandates of ASC 718 and make it clear that companies are required to disclose all
inputs into these models. The only possible objection would be that firms would be forced to
disclose proprietary information, but it is hard to see the risk of disclosing, e.g., estimates of
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It is not clear whether the disclosure requirements are insufficient or if firms such as CenturyLink are failing to
supply required disclosures. The SEC piggybacks off of FASB disclosure requirements. SEC Reg. S-K, Item 402.
FASB requires disclosure of “significant assumptions used … to estimate the fair value … of share based
compensation awards, including (if applicable)” term, expected share volatility, expected dividends, and risk-free
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cross-volatility of share prices. These disclosures would not preclude firms from making
opportunistic assumptions with respect to model inputs, but transparency should curtail the most
egregious practices.
Firms are not currently modeling the impact of accounting-based performance conditions
on the per share value of awards. Instead, they report grant date compensation cost based on the
number of shares probable to vest, with no specific disclosure requirement attached to this
analysis. Commentators suggest that this “discretion” is attractive to issuers,217 and BBCK
report that firms are increasingly adopting accounting-based metrics in performance share plans.
This accounting/valuation advantage could be addressed in several ways. First, FASB could
mandate disclosure of the detailed process through which a firm determines the number of shares
probable to vest and the assumptions underpinning that analysis. Of course, companies may be
concerned that disclosure of assumptions regarding sales, earnings, etc., would jeopardize
confidential information. More modestly, FASB could require companies to provide historical
tabular disclosure of the performance targets that determined grant date executive pay – the most
probable performance level at the time of grant – and the ultimate performance level achieved.
Of course, internal and external conditions change over a performance period. We would not
expect the target to be hit consistently. But if a company is regularly achieving maximum
performance, while basing executive pay disclosures on target or threshold performance, that
might indicate purposeful under-reporting.
More aggressively, FASB could extend the market condition method to all plans,
including plans incorporating accounting-based metrics. This may not be an ideal response, as
the result would likely be systematic undervaluation and underreporting of compensation
expense for all performance share plans arising from opportunistic selection of model inputs.
And this ignores the inherent difficulty of ex ante valuation of plans incorporating accountingbased and other non-price, non-market metrics, such as safety targets.218 On the other hand, if
the problems associated with ex ante valuation of performance-based equity incorporating
accounting-based performance measures could be overcome, adopting this approach would, in
theory, level the accounting playing field between conventional stock and options, and
performance-based equity pay, and, of course, between performance share plans incorporating
different types of metrics.219

217

BBCK (2013) at 7 (suggesting “flexible” accounting as a reason for shift in favor of accounting metrics); Core &
Packard at 8-9 (stating that “firms concerned about earnings targets will want the discretion that comes from”
incorporation of accounting-based metrics).
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Although I have divided the world of performance share metrics into market and accounting-based metrics, the
reality is more complex. To be sure, most plans involve either or both market and accounting-based metrics, but
other metrics, such as safety performance, are possible, and ASC 718 more accurately divides the world of
performance metrics into share price/market based and “other.” ASC 718-20-20.
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I say “in theory” because the concern would remain that firms would have greater discretion to minimize reported
compensation expense with respect to more complex performance-based equity pay plans than with respect to
conventional options, and more discretion with respect to options than restricted stock, bonus, and salary.
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Highly accurate grant date valuation of these complex instruments may not be attainable.
Instead of or in addition to the forgoing suggestions, the SEC should consider de-emphasizing
grant date executive pay data. For example, instead of basing its new pay ratio and pay versus
performance disclosures on grant date executive compensation data, the SEC could have
employed a moving average of realized pay. The realized value of equity pay reflects market
movements as well as compensation per se, which is why the SEC has focused historically on ex
ante pay calculations in making various comparisons. But as uncertainty and gaming
opportunities increase ex ante, the noisiness of ex post data may become the lesser of two
evils.220
2. Gaming
The gaming potential of awards incorporating performance conditions and market
conditions are similar. In both cases, executives’ inside information may be used to
opportunistically select metrics and, when relative measures are employed, peer group
membership. Gaming of performance metrics can be curtailed, but not eliminated. Investors and
conscientious directors need to recognize the gaming opportunities and take steps to minimize
them, or at the very least, to consider the gaming risk in thinking about the tradeoffs. For
example, while it might seem more accurate to measure performance relative to that of a small
group of peer companies, that selection is gameable.221 Relative performance evaluation against
a broad index, such as the S&P 500, is much less gameable. There’s a tradeoff. Similarly,
revising the selection of performance categories from plan to plan might be an optimal response
to changes in firm priorities in a dynamic market. Sales might be the priority for the 2014 plan;
earnings for the 2015 plan; and cash flow for the 2016 plan. But every time a firm chooses a
new performance category or categories, there’s an opportunity for executives with inside
information to game the selection.
In order to minimize gaming, ideally executives would be excluded from the process of
choosing peer groups and performance categories, but that is probably unrealistic. Performance
metrics should reflect firm priorities, and the executives are experts on those priorities.
Nonetheless, like other executive pay decisions in modern corporations, these decisions need to
be managed closely by independent compensation committees and independent consultants who
work directly for the independent committees. All of these people need to be finely attuned to
the gaming risks.
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Executive discretion over the timing of stock option exercise also introduces noise into realized pay data, but this
is not an issue with respect to performance share plans that are typically adopted annually with the same set term
(most often three years) for each annual plan. In any event, a moving average of would reduce the noise in annual
realized pay levels.
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Cf Faulkender & Yang, supra note x; Bizjak et al, supra note x (providing evidence of gaming in the selection of
compensation peer group members).
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3. Compensation Expense
As we have seen, the two accounting methods applicable to performance share plans are
both likely to result in under-reporting of compensation expense, but for different reasons. For
typical plans, the performance condition method results in a downward bias in expected
compensation expense (as well as discretion to minimize grant date executive pay in the proxy
statement), while the market condition method opens the door for opportunistic selection of
assumptions that reduce reported and expected compensation expense. Firms may prefer one of
these two methods based solely on their accounting preferences, or, as we have seen, firms may
adopt both by incorporating both types of performance metrics, thereby further minimizing
expected compensation expense.
The two approaches are also likely to result in a significant book/tax gap with respect to
executive pay. The book/tax gap refers to the difference between the amount of compensation
expense reported to shareholders (book) and the amount reported to the IRS as deductible
compensation expense (tax).222 Some commentators and several prominent politicians have
argued for conforming the book and tax treatment of executive pay as a means of limiting
gaming of tax deductions (also known as sheltering), expense recognition (also known as
cooking the books) or both.223 Before the advent of performance-based equity compensation,
stock options were the primary concern. A stock option book/tax gap arises because GAAP
expense is based on a manipulable “fair value” determination at grant, while the tax deduction is
based on the gain actually realized by an employee on exercise.224 Although market movements
in the years between grant and exercise can result in dramatic differences between book and tax
expense recognition for particular options, the only systematic concern is that book expense is
being minimized through the opportunistic selection of assumptions. To be clear, to the extent
that firms use unbiased assumptions in calculating grant date value, except for time value, there
would be no expected difference between book and tax expense for options.225
Performance-based equity exacerbates the book/tax gap problem. As noted above, the
current GAAP treatment of plans utilizing an accounting-based performance measure will result
in expected book expense that is systematically less than the expected realized value of the
instrument. Since tax is based on realized values, book expense will not just vary randomly from
tax expense, it will be systematically lower. Performance plans that utilize only stock price
measures, such as relative TSR plans, are accounted for just like options. The concern here is
that the additional complexity and obscurity of these instruments will make it easier for firms to
choose valuation assumptions that result in accounting expense that is downward biased. The
book/tax concern with options will be magnified for these plans.
222
David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 62 Tax Law Rev. 399,
400-03 (2009); Celia Whitaker, Bridging the Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680, 684-85 (2005).
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The fair value of an option as calculated using Black Scholes or other accepted methodologies is the discounted
present value of the expected value on realization.
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But there is a solution to the problem of compensation expense dis-uniformity and the
book/tax gap. Several years ago, Victor Fleischer and I suggested applying mark-to-market
accounting treatment to compensatory stock options.226 The idea was to ensure that the aggregate
compensation expense for options matched the realized value of these instruments and to
conform the book and tax treatment for options. An additional advantage to this proposal was
that it reduced the benefit to firms of undervaluing options ex ante. A low ex ante valuation
might reduce the level of executive pay disclosed in the proxy statement, but would not impact
the ultimate book expense for compensation. As a result, firms would have less of an incentive
to manipulate the ex ante value of options and less of an incentive to utilize options in the first
place, over cash, restricted stock, or other forms of compensation.227
In my view, the rise of performance shares increases the attractiveness of that suggestion
and increases the urgency. Under a mark-to-market approach, firms would estimate fair value at
grant and begin expense accruals with that valuation. Firms would update their valuations
periodically and revise accruals as necessary. In the case of options and performance share plans
employing stock price or market metrics only, fair value would be recalculated periodically using
the same model that firms use today at grant. In the case of performance share plans employing
only accounting-based metrics, at the end of each period firms would calculate “fair value” by
determining the number of shares that are probable to vest and multiplying by the current share
price, not the share price at the time of the grant. For performance share plans incorporating
both market and performance conditions, fair value would be recalculated by model periodically
reflecting the market condition and at the same time the firm would reassess the number of
shares that are probable to vest given the accounting-based performance condition. In all cases,
the instruments will vest (or not) and aggregate expense recognition would be trued up to the
transparent value at vesting. As a result, mark to market accounting reduces the incentive to
select model inputs opportunistically to minimize valuations because these assumptions only
impact initial and intermediate expense disclosures, not the ultimate book expense for
performance-based equity pay.
This accounting approach is already in existence. It is the accounting treatment that
applies to SARs and other “liability awards” under ASC Topic 718, including cash-settled
performance plans that employ accounting-based metrics.228 In order to ensure a level playing
field, this mark-to-market approach should apply to all forms of long-term compensation –
conventional restricted stock, options, and performance-based equity pay, in addition to SARs
and cash settled performance plans.
Not only is this approach already in existence, it was the approach applicable to
performance share grants prior to the issuance of SFAS 123R.229 In other words, I am proposing
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a return to mark-to-market accounting for these instruments, but importantly, also for all forms
of long-term compensation.230 In my view, this would be the most effective way to level the
playing field between compensation instruments and ensure that book compensation expense
reflects reality.
Some may argue that mark-to-market accounting creates too much uncertainty for issuers
and too much noise in compensation cost recognition.231 The realized value of a performance
share award, and the compensation cost recognized under mark-to-market accounting, may far
exceed the value at grant if the company’s stock price rises precipitously. This is true, but the
problem, if it is a problem, could be managed by capping award payouts. And note that firms do
not appear to be discouraged from incorporating accounting-based metrics in performance share
plans, which can result today in significant variability (or noise) in the ultimate compensation
expense that is booked.232 In fact, some view this feature as a plus as it tends to smooth earnings,
particularly when the metric is a measure of earnings.233 But variable accounting would also
tend to smooth earnings; not perfectly, of course, share prices could rise for reasons other than
strong earnings. But if earnings and share price are correlated, variable accounting would serve
an earnings-smoothing function.
The noise inherent in mark-to-market accounting for equity pay would reduce
comparability of earnings from firm to firm and over time. This is an unavoidable downside.
The question is whether we’ve reached the point in equity pay evolution at which mark-tomarket accounting is the lesser of two evils; whether noisiness in book expense is an acceptable
price for leveling the playing field between various equity pay instruments, eliminating
downward biases, and counteracting enhanced manipulability of ex ante valuation. It’s a
tradeoff, and the answer is not obvious. Further analysis must be left to future work. I am not
concerned, however, that imposing mark-to-market accounting would kill equity pay or longterm pay more generally.234 As long as the method is applied consistently to all forms of longterm compensation, the playing field will be level and firms will be more likely to select
performance metrics based on their merits. There may be some modest shift back towards salary
230
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and short-term cash bonuses, but the forces lined up in favor of strengthening the link between
pay and long-term performance, including the proxy advisory services, seem much too strong to
countenance a significant move away from equity pay.235

V. Conclusion
No executive pay innovation ever seems to provide an unalloyed good, and
performance-based equity is no exception. While these instruments provide tremendous
flexibility and the potential to improve executive incentives – particularly through enhanced
relative performance evaluation – the complexity of these instruments creates daunting
challenges for our executive pay disclosure and compensation cost reporting regimes. The key,
as always, is to hang onto the baby; to manage the disclosure, accounting, and gaming issues
while preserving the incentive-enhancing properties of these instruments. This article has
offered a few tentative suggestions along those lines, and the hope is that unpacking these
instruments for a non-technical legal audience will prompt more thought and debate on
appropriate and helpful regulatory responses to this evolving pay landscape.
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Some observers have voiced concern that the SEC’s proposed equity pay clawback regulations may cause firms
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